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RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I.

PARISH V. MORRIS 1

In Parish v. Morris, the Montana Supreme Court held that insureds are
not entitled to stack2 coverage when they pay one premium for uninsured
motorist (“UM”) coverage for multiple vehicles unless the policy states otherwise.3 Prior to Parish, the Court held that insureds are entitled to stack
UM coverage when they pay individual UM premiums for multiple vehicles
under an insurance policy.4 Though Parish does not alter prior holdings on
stacking, it clarifies Montana’s anti-stacking statute, Montana Code Annotated § 33–23–203.
From May 2007 through September 2008, United Financial Casualty
Insurance Company (“United”) provided motor vehicle insurance coverage
to Cassadie and Chris Parish.5 During that time, the Parishes insured either
one or two vehicles depending on the specific period.6 Regardless of the
number of vehicles the Parishes insured on the policy, they paid a flat UM
premium of $73.00 for the first year and $82.00 for the second year of
coverage.7 The policy provided UM coverage of $50,000 for each person
and $100,000 for each accident.8 The Parishes’ policy prohibited the stacking of UM coverage with a provision stating that “policy limits shown for
1. Parish v. Morris, 278 P.3d 1015 (Mont. 2012).
2. Stacking is the practice of “add[ing] the policy limit of UM, underinsured motorist (“UIM”), or
medical pay coverage from an insurance policy on one vehicle with the UM, UIM and medical pay
policy limits from the policy on another vehicle.” Parish, 278 P.3d at 1017, n. 1.
3. Parish, 278 P.3d at 1019–1020.
4. Id. at 1019.
5. Id. at 1016.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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an auto may not be combined with the limits for the same coverage on
another auto, unless the policy contract allows the stacking of limits.”9
The Parishes were struck and injured by an uninsured motorist in a car
accident on December 31, 2007.10 United paid Cassadie and Chris $50,000
each in UM benefits and $10,000 each in medical payment benefits.11
Chris’s injuries did not exceed $60,000, but Cassadie’s injuries did.12 Because the Parishes had two vehicles insured at the time of the accident, they
claimed they were each entitled to stack UM benefits up to $100,000.13
United denied the Parishes’ request to stack benefits, so the Parishes sued
seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to stack.14
United moved for summary judgment, claiming the Parishes were
not allowed to stack benefits because: 1) the policy was legal under
§ 33–23–203; 2) the Parishes’ policy explicitly did not allow stacking; and
3) existing case law only required stacking if the Parishes paid separate
premiums for each vehicle.15 The Parishes argued UM benefits could be
stacked because: 1) the policy was filed with the Insurance Commissioner
too late to comply with § 33–23–203; 2) the policy was ambiguous and
should therefore be construed against United; and 3) the Parishes reasonably believed they could stack benefits.16
The district court found United’s policy to be in compliance with
§ 33–23–203 and granted summary judgment for United on the grounds
that the Parishes paid only one UM premium regardless of how many vehicles were on the policy.17 The Parishes appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court.18 The most significant question presented on appeal was whether an
insured may stack uninsured motorist benefits when only one premium has
been paid for multiple vehicles.19
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that
insureds are not entitled to stack benefits when one premium has been paid
for multiple vehicles.20 The Court distinguished previous cases where it
held insureds were allowed to stack coverage by pointing out that those
holdings were based on situations where insureds were paying separate pre9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Parish, 278 P.3d at 1016–1017.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Parish, 278 P.3d at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1017–1018.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1019–1020.
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miums for each insured vehicle.21 In those cases, the Court held that an
anti-stacking provision that allows an insurer “to receive valuable consideration for coverage that is not provided violates Montana public policy.”22
The Court distinguished the Parishes’ situation, recognizing they paid one
flat rate for UM coverage and did not pay separate consideration for each
vehicle on the policy.23
The Court proceeded to discuss Montana’s anti-stacking statute,
§ 33–23–203, which was amended in 2007 and went into effect on April
17, 2007.24 In pertinent part, the statute provides:
(1) Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise,
the limits of insurance coverage available under each part of the policy must
be determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles insured
under the policy, the number of policies issued by the same company covering the insured, or the number of separate premiums paid:
.
.
.
(c) the limits of the coverages specified under one policy or under more than
one policy issued by the same company may not be added together to determine the limits of insurance coverages available under the policy or policies
for any one accident if the premiums charged for the coverage by the insurer
actuarially reflect the limiting of coverage separately to the vehicles covered
by the policy and the premium rates have been filed with the commissioner.25

The Court recognized that after the statute was amended, the Insurance
Commissioner issued an Advisory Memorandum on August 29, 2007, informing insurers of the changes to § 33–23–203.26 The Advisory Memorandum informed insurers they may avoid stacking if they meet filing requirements and provide actuarial documentation showing the rates reflect
the limiting of coverage.27 Though United claimed it had complied with the
statute and the advice set out in the Advisory Memorandum,28 the Court did
not directly address whether this was important to its holding and ultimately
focused on the fact that the Parishes had only paid one UM premium.29
The Parish decision significantly limits the amount an injured party
may receive from a motor vehicle liability policy in Montana. Unless a
policy states otherwise, § 33–23–203 prohibits insureds from stacking benefits in cases where one premium is paid for multiple vehicles. Because the
Court did not expressly rely on the statute, it remains to be seen how
21. Parish, 278 P.3d at 1019 (citing Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 67 P.3d 892, 899
(Mont. 2003); Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Mont. 1993)).
22. Parish, 278 P.3d at 1019 (quoting Hardy, 67 P.3d at 899; Bennett, 862 P.2d at 1148).
23. Parish, 278 P.3d at 1019–1020.
24. Id. at 1018.
25. Mont. Code Ann. § 33–23–203 (2007).
26. Parish, 278 P.3d at 1018.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1018–1019.
29. Id. at 1019–1020.
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§ 33–23–203 will affect insureds paying separate premiums under a policy
that has complied with statutory requirements. Montana practitioners
should be aware that Parish reinforces the policy allowing insurers to deny
stacking where insureds paid only one UM, UIM, or medical payments premium, regardless of the number of vehicles insured under the policy.
—Trevor Carlson
II.

MILLER V. STATE 30

In Miller v. State, the Montana Supreme Court maintained the heavy
burden placed on convicted defendants who seek postconviction relief
based on claim(s) of ineffective assistance of counsel.31 Despite Defendant
Michael Miller’s numerous claims of ineffective counsel, the Eighth Judicial District dismissed his petition for postconviction relief.32 Miller appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s
ruling.33
On June, 26, 2006, Lamar Windham (“Windham”), Al Johnson
(“Johnson”), and Defendant Michael Miller (“Miller”) drank alcohol and
drove around Great Falls.34 Eventually, Windham parked his van at the
Rainbow Dam Overlook of the Giant Springs area.35 Windham and Miller
departed the van and began walking down a trail leading to the river and
dam.36 From the van, Johnson observed them arguing as they walked.37
After less than an hour, Miller returned to the van alone.38 In response to
Johnson’s questions regarding Windham’s whereabouts, Miller failed to
provide consistent answers.39 Miller and Johnson waited an hour and a half
for Windham to return; then, Miller delivered Johnson home and conveyed
his intention to return to the area to search for Windham.40
During the ensuing days, Miller used Windham’s van and offered varying stories about what happened to Windham.41 After growing increasingly concerned, Windham’s family contacted Johnson, who relayed the
events of June 26th.42 Accompanied by Windham’s family, Miller and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Miller v. State, 280 P.3d 272 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 278 (citing Baca v. State, 197 P.3d 948, 952 (Mont. 2008)).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 276.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 280 P.3d at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Johnson drove to Giant Springs and searched for Windham.43 Having been
unsuccessful in its search, the group reported Windham missing to the police.44 After finding Windham’s body on the river bottom below the cliff at
the Rainbow Scenic Overlook, law enforcement arrested Miller.45 He was
charged with, and later convicted of, deliberate homicide.46
After Miller’s unsuccessful appeal, he filed a petition for postconviction relief in district court.47 Miller alleged ineffective trial counsel based
on his lawyer’s failure to: 1) object to the State’s PowerPoint presentations;
2) request the State’s PowerPoint presentations be entered into the record;
3) object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and rebuttal; 4) impeach
Johnson; 5) impeach Ray Little Youngman, another witness; and 6) object
to the State’s comments made during Miller’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.48 In addition, Miller alleged ineffective appellate counsel
based on the failure to raise the issue of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.49
The district court dismissed Miller’s petition for postconviction relief
for failure to state a claim for relief.50 The district court reasoned Miller
had exhausted his opportunity to appeal by having raised, or having missed
the opportunity to raise, his claims of ineffective counsel on appeal.51
The district court ruled that Miller’s claims against appellate counsel
were procedurally barred, though on appeal the State conceded his claims
were not procedurally barred.52 On appeal, Miller requested the Court remand his case, grant an evidentiary hearing, and provide him counsel.53
However, the Montana Supreme Court agreed with the State, that neither
remand nor an evidentiary hearing was necessary because the record provided sufficient information to analyze the merits of Miller’s claims against
trial counsel.54 Because Miller’s claims against trial counsel provided the
foundation for his claims against appellate counsel, the Court similarly held
the record was sufficient to analyze the merits of those claims.55 Consequently, the Court proceeded to review Miller’s claims against trial counsel.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Miller, 280 P.3d at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 280 P.3d at 276.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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When a convicted defendant claims ineffective counsel, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo by the appellate court.56 The
Montana Supreme Court analyzes a convicted defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel (appellate or trial) by applying a two-part test, both parts of
which must be met for a claim to be successful.57 First, the defendant must
show counsel’s performance was deficient.58 In analyzing the alleged deficiency, the Court determines “[w]hether counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional
norms and all the circumstances.”59 If the first prong is met, the defendant
must then prove counsel’s deficient conduct prejudiced him.60 In analyzing
prejudice, the Court applies a cause-in-fact test61 to determine “[w]hether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal.”62
Furthermore, the Court recognized, a petitioner who seeks postconviction relief based on ineffective appellate counsel bears a heavy burden.63
The Court recognized appellate defense attorneys enjoy a presumption of
effective assistance of counsel, which can only be overcome if the petitioner
can show the alleged “[i]gnored issues are clearly stronger than those issues
presented” on appeal.64
In ultimately holding the district court did not err because all of
Miller’s allegations lacked merit, the Court only twice reached the second
prong of the two-part test.65 Regarding Miller’s claim about the State’s
PowerPoint presentations, the Court held Miller failed to demonstrate that
prejudice resulted from either trial counsel’s failure to object to the
presentations themselves or failure to timely move to enter the presentations
into the record.66 The Court held Miller’s claim regarding trial counsel’s
failure to object during the State’s closing argument lacked merit because
the prosecutor properly referenced Johnson’s credibility and Miller’s lack
thereof.67
Next, the Court held Miller’s four-part claim regarding failure to impeach Johnson lacked merit.68 The Court found trial counsel appropriately
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Miller, 280 P.3d at 277 (citing Whitlow v. State, 183 P.3d 861, 864 (Mont. 2008)).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting St. Germain v. State, 276 P.3d 886, 890 (Mont. 2012)).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 277 (quoting DuBray v. State, 182 P.3d 753, 758 (Mont. 2008)).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 277–278 (quoting Baca, 197 P.3d at 952).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 277–278 (quoting DuBray, 182 P.3d at 758).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 278–282.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 278–279.
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highlighted Johnson’s inconsistent statements about the location of the
parked van through cross-examinations of both Johnson and Officer Phillips
and again during closing argument.69 Similarly, the Court found trial counsel appropriately stressed Johnson’s inconsistent statements regarding the
duration of time Johnson slept in the van during cross-examinations of both
Johnson and Officer Phillips.70 Further, the Court found no prejudice to
Miller resulted from trial counsel’s missed opportunities to reemphasize
Johnson’s conflicting testimony regarding drinking alcohol.71 Lastly, the
Court held trial counsel’s alleged failure to impeach Johnson based on his
shaky memory regarding the van’s keys lacked merit because trial counsel
did, in fact, impeach Johnson on cross-examination.72
Despite Miller’s contention to the contrary, the Court also held trial
counsel sufficiently impeached Ray Little Youngman.73 Miller argued his
counsel failed to impeach Youngman on two separate issues.74 First, while
on the stand, Youngman presented conflicting testimony about the location
of a conversation between him and Miller.75 The Court held trial counsel
effectively highlighted this during cross-examination of Mary Griffin and
again during closing argument.76 Second, Miller argued trial counsel failed
to challenge Youngman’s testimony regarding Miller’s behavior during the
Windham family’s search.77 The Court rejected Miller’s argument again
because the record showed trial counsel impeached Youngman during Griffin’s cross-examination and appropriately referenced it during closing argument.78
Finally, the Court held Miller’s claim of ineffective counsel based on
failure to object to the State’s characterization of its forensic pathologist’s
testimony lacked merit.79 In responding to Defendant’s motion to dismiss,
the State cited its forensic pathologist’s testimony as supporting Miller’s
guilt.80 Although the forensic pathologist had testified the cause of
Windham’s death was “undetermined,” the Court held the State’s reference
to this testimony as supportive of its case did not prejudice Miller.81
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Miller, 280 P.3d at 279–280.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 280–281.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id. at 280–281.
Miller, 280 P.3d at 281.
Id.
Id. at 281–282.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–282.
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Miller reinforces the high threshold required for a convicted defendant
to successfully claim ineffective counsel. Defense attorneys do not have a
constitutional obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal.82
Furthermore, both trial and appellate defense attorneys enjoy a presumption
of effective assistance of counsel.83 When the record supports defense
counsel’s sufficiency in cross examination, objections, and impeachments,
the Court appears disinclined to grant a convicted defendant’s petition for
postconviction relief.
—Michel Fullerton
III.

REICHERT V. STATE

EX REL.

MCCULLOCH 84

Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch clarified the Montana Supreme
Court’s ability to intervene on constitutional referendum issues and highlighted the requirements governing recusal of justices.85 The Court held
unconstitutional proposed amendments in Legislative Referendum No. 119
(“LR–119”), which would have eliminated statewide elections for Supreme
Court justices and would have required justices to be elected from specific
districts.86 Though the issue was only raised by amicus curiae, the Court
held that recusal of certain justices was not necessary.87 Additionally, the
Court held the complaint was justiciable, despite the fact the electorate had
not yet had the opportunity to vote on the referendum.88
On April 18, 2011, Senate Bill No. 268 (“SB 268”) was filed with the
Secretary of State.89 SB 268, enacted by the 62nd Montana Legislature,
would have submitted LR–119 to voters, asking whether changes should be
made to the process of electing Montana Supreme Court justices.90 The
voters were to consider LR–119 in a special election to be held concurrent
with the primary election on June 5, 2012.91
LR–119 would have made three changes to the law governing the election of Montana Supreme Court justices.92 First, it would have eliminated
the statewide election for each justice.93 Instead, the state would have been
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 277 (quoting DuBray, 182 P.3d at 758).
Miller, 280 P.3d at 277 (quoting DuBray, 182 P.3d at 758).
Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 463–464, 471.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 458.
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 458.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id.
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divided into seven districts, with each district having an approximately
equal population.94 Each justice’s seat would have corresponded to a district, and only eligible voters in each district could have voted for that district’s justice.95 Second, LR–119 mandated that each candidate for justice
reside in, and be a registered voter in, the district corresponding to the specific seat.96 Finally, the selection of the chief justice would have shifted
from the current statewide election to selection by the elected justices themselves.97 Electors would only be able to vote for one justice every eight
years rather than each of the seven justices as they come up for re-election.98
The plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of LR–119 were “Montana citizens, taxpayers, and electors who historically have participated in
elections for justices of the Montana Supreme Court and who reside in each
of the seven districts proposed by LR–119.”99 The plaintiffs named the
State as the defendant through the Secretary of State, Linda McCulloch.100
The plaintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment ruling LR–119 constitutionally defective and for the district court to decertify the referendum and prevent the State from placing it on the ballot.101 The State responded that the
constitutional challenge was not ripe and that LR–119 was not constitutionally defective.102 Before the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, seven
Montana legislators (“Legislators”) filed a motion to intervene as defendants pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 24.103 Though the district court denied the Legislators’ motion, it permitted the Legislators to
participate as amicus curiae.104 After the Legislators’ petition for writ of
supervisory control challenging the denial of their motion to intervene
failed, the Supreme Court noted the Legislators could file an amicus brief
by March 19, 2012.105
The district court held the summary judgment hearing on March 14.106
The Legislators did not file an amicus brief, but the district court considered
documents previously filed by the Legislators due to an earlier request.107
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 459.
Id. at 459–460.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On March 20, the district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.108
The district court ordered the Secretary of State to decertify LR–119,
thereby preventing it from being placed on the ballot for the June 5, 2012,
election.109
On March 21, the State appealed the district court’s order to the Montana Supreme Court and moved the district court for an immediate stay of
the order.110 The State argued that if LR–119 was not certified by 5:00
p.m. on March 22, the production of voter information pamphlets on the
issue would cease and ballots would not include LR–119.111 If the district
court granted a stay, the pamphlets and ballots would already be prepared if
the district court’s order was reversed.112 The State, however, did not request the motion be brought to the district court’s attention within a certain
timeframe or make clear there was such a deadline.113 The motion was not
presented to the district court until March 23, and, as the deadline had already passed for certification, the motion was denied.114
Finally, the State filed a motion with the Montana Supreme Court to
expedite the appeal in order to comply with deadlines for overseas and absentee ballots.115 The Court granted the State’s motion on April 5 and issued an order affirming the district court on April 12; the Court’s opinion,
analysis, and rationale followed on May 18, 2012.116
In its opinion, the Court first discussed the issue of recusal for the four
non-retiring justices.117 Ultimately, the Court held recusal was not required
for the four non-retiring justices in this case.118 This holding is particularly
interesting because the Legislators, as amici curiae, raised this issue.119 As
a general rule, amici curiae cannot raise separate issues not addressed by a
party.120 Only in rare instances does the Court deviate from this rule.121
The Court concluded, however, the importance of the recusal issue made it
one of the rare exceptions allowing deviation.122
108. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 460.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 460–461.
112. Id. at 461.
113. Id.
114. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 461.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 463. Chief Justice McGrath and Justice Morris recused themselves, and Justice Nelson
had already announced his retirement, leaving only four non-retiring justices.
118. Id. at 471.
119. Id. at 464.
120. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 463.
121. Id. at 464; see Crabtree v. Mont. St. Lib., 665 P.2d 231, 234–235 (Mont. 1983).
122. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 464.
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Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the Court recognized that
due process requires recusal when “the probability of actual bias on the part
of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”123 This objective inquiry asks whether an average judge would be
unable to remain impartial enough as to hold the balance “nice, clear and
true.”124 Under this standard, the Court explained the issues in Reichert did
not rise to those of a constitutional nature and recusal was not necessary
under due process.125 Further, the Court held recusal was not necessary
under Montana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.12(A), which requires
recusal when a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned.126 The
Court reasoned that the potential for the justices to have an interest in the
case was too tenuous and that such theoretical interests did not require
recusal.127 Refuting the Legislators’ argument that district court judges
could fill in for recused Supreme Court justices, the Court pointed out that
district court judges have the same ability to run for a justice seat.128
On the next issue, the Court held the challenge to LR–119 was ripe.129
The Court recognized that although judicial review of election referenda or
initiatives should not be routinely conducted, it may be appropriate when a
challenged measure is facially defective.130 The Court further reasoned that
placing such a measure on the ballot would be a waste of time and money
and would give voters the false impression their vote could matter.131
In addressing the substance of LR-119, the Court held LR–119 imposes a set of impermissible amendments to the Montana Constitution. The
Court found the new qualifications for Supreme Court justices established
in LR–119 amounted to a constitutional amendment.132 Similarly, the
Court held LR–119 further amended the Montana Constitution by altering
the statewide election system into a system of seven districts.133 LR–119
would have eliminated the current right Montana voters have to participate
in the election for every Montana Supreme Court justice.134 The Court
noted the Montana Constitution provides for this right by mandating the
statewide election of Supreme Court justices and permitting a candidate to
123. Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
124. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 464 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 879
(2009)).
125. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 469.
126. Id. at 471 (citing Mont. Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.12(A)).
127. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 468, 471.
128. Id. at 469.
129. Id. at 474.
130. Id. at 473–474.
131. Id. at 474.
132. Id. at 481.
133. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 481.
134. Id.
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reside anywhere within the state.135 The Court held these de facto constitutional amendments proposed in LR–119 could not be made by statutory
referendum.136 Rather, the Court explained, the Montana Constitution may
only be amended by the detailed methods laid out in the Constitution.137
Moving on, the Court concluded these facially unconstitutional provisions
could not be severed from the rest of the referendum because the remaining
provisions did not fulfill the purpose behind LR–119.138
Justice Baker concurred with the majority on the issue of recusal but
dissented from the decision to decertify LR–119.139 Justice Baker argued
the referendum process involves two steps and the Court should only rule
on the constitutionality if, and only if, the challenged law has been enacted.140 She contended decertification was inappropriate because the only
time a pre-election challenge to the constitutionality of a law should be
reviewed by a court is when it would create a change that could only be
remedied by another election.141 After she found LR–119 did not meet this
requirement for a pre-election challenge, Justice Baker further reasoned the
majority’s reliance on the election’s consumption of resources was misguided because it did not outweigh the people’s right to vote.142
Montana practitioners should be aware of Reichert because it clarified
the Court’s ability and willingness to intervene on pre-election legislative
referenda. If a measure is facially unconstitutional, it need not be duly enacted before a court may declare it unconstitutional. Reichert also clarified
that the recusal of justices or judges may not be necessary when the possibility they will have an interest in the outcome of a case is purely speculative. The Reichert Court also expanded the scope of issues the Court may
consider when presented solely by amicus curiae. These issues may be examined in a case if they reach a level of extreme importance to the Court.
Finally, changes to the election requirements of Montana Supreme Court
justices must follow the constitutional amendment guidelines in order for
any measure to be effective. A legislative referendum alone is inadequate.
—Pamela Garman

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 475.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 478 (citing Mont. Const. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2, 8, 9).
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 482–483.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
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237

FUNK 143

In In re Marriage of Funk, the Montana Supreme Court took steps to
eliminate inconsistencies in its approach to the distribution of inherited
property during dissolution proceedings.144 The Court held that Montana
Code Annotated § 40–4–202(1) obligates a court to equitably apportion all
assets and property of the spouses regardless of when or how they were
acquired, including inherited property.145 Further, a court must demonstrate
it analyzed the enumerated statutory considerations when making decisions
with respect to inherited property.146
Kevin and June Funk married in late 1990. Within three years, June
had become a homemaker while Kevin worked for Montana Rail Link.147
In 1996, Kevin inherited over 115 acres of real property from his father, 2.5
acres of which were lakefront property on Flathead Lake.148 The Funks had
a child in 1997, and ten years later Kevin quit his job with Montana Rail
Link.149 After Kevin left his job, he and June lived off of the proceeds of
his individual retirement account (IRA) while Kevin unsuccessfully attempted to day trade.150 In 2009, June filed for dissolution of marriage
after separating from Kevin several months earlier.151
In its decree, the district court followed the guidelines of Montana
Code Annotated § 40–4–202 when dividing the marital property.152 The
court awarded June one-half the value of the lakefront property Kevin had
inherited and one-third of the increased value of the non-lakefront property
for a total amount of $344,167.153 The court ordered Kevin to pay the sum
within six months, unless he needed to sell the property to finance the
amount, in which case he would have two years after the dissolution to pay
June.154 The court also awarded June a portion of Kevin’s railroad retirement, an automobile, and a sum of money representing the value of a second automobile Kevin purchased after the couple had separated.155 Finally,
the court directed Kevin to pay June monthly maintenance of $500, retroac143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

In re Marriage of Funk, 270 P.3d 39 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Funk, 270 P.3d at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Funk, 270 P.3d at 41.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013

13

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON101.txt

unknown

Seq: 14

8-APR-13

8:52

Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 11

238

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74

tive to March 2009, until June received her entire award or for a period of 5
years.156 Kevin appealed the district court’s rulings.157
During oral arguments before the Montana Supreme Court, both parties drew attention to the conflicting results created by the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to § 40–4–202(1).158 While some courts have excluded
inherited property from the marital estate unequivocally, others have automatically included it or decided the matter on a basis of various criteria.159
Both parties asserted that, under § 40–4–202(1), a district court should be
allowed to determine if the non-inheriting spouse is entitled to a portion of
the property when considering the statutory factors, and inherited property
should not be automatically excluded from the marital estate.160
The Montana Supreme Court reviews a district court’s interpretation of
a statute governing the distribution of a marital estate de novo for correctness, only reversing a decision in instances in which there are clearly erroneous findings considering the unique circumstances of the case.161 The
Funk Court began its analysis by citing § 40–4–202, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage . . . the court, without regard
to marital misconduct, shall . . . finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired. In dividing property acquired . . . by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent; property acquired . . . in exchange for property acquired by gift,
bequest, device, or descent; the increased value of property acquired prior to
marriage . . . the court shall consider those contributions of the other spouse to
the marriage including:
(a) the nonmonetary contribution of the homemaker;
(b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of
this property; and
(c) whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to maintenance arrangements.162

The Court noted that § 40–4–202 is taken from the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act (“UMDA”), which Montana adopted in 1975.163 In prior cases
the Court concluded that the first three sentences outline the general purpose of the statute, which is to allow for equitable apportionment of property and assets to either or both parties.164 The Court acknowledged it has
historically treated inherited property differently from other property, not156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 41.
Funk, 270 P.3d at 41 (citing In re C.D.H., 201 P.3d 126 (Mont. 2009)).
Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–202(1) (2011).
Funk, 270 P.3d at 42.
Id. (citing In re Marriage of Herron, 608 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1980)).
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ing that the last three sentences of the statute seem to set it apart. The Court
opined that the main issue in uniformly applying § 40–4–202 comes from
its unclear structure and drew attention to the fact that the confusing language was not a part of the amended UMDA, but was added by the Montana Legislature without reason.165 Because the last three sentences have
led to such inconsistency, the Court endeavored to make a final determination on the meaning of the statute in hopes it would facilitate more uniform
application.166
In setting forth the new rule, the Court stated § 40–4–202(1) obligates
courts to apportion all assets and properties between spouses, including inherited and previously acquired property.167 The Court went on to say that,
even though the directive applies to all property, the three factors set forth
in § 40–4–202(1) regarding inherited property must be affirmatively considered and analyzed when a court determines how it is distributed.168 Finally, the Court put great emphasis on the notion that while the statutory
factors must be considered when making a decree, they are never to be
considered limitations on the court’s obligation to make decisions in light of
the unique factors that each case presents.169
Redirecting its attention to the case at hand, the Court addressed Kevin’s argument, based on In re Marriage of Smith,170 that June was not
entitled to the inherited property because she did not help to preserve the
property or increase its value.171 In Smith, the Court first limited its power
to apportion assets by ruling it could not distribute inherited property to a
non-acquiring spouse without a showing of such a contribution.172 Funk
overruled Smith and its progeny, with the Court concluding that such a bar
on the Court’s power would work in opposition to the dominant purpose of
the statute and would be incompatible with the new rule.173
Reviewing the district court’s decree regarding the Funks, the Court
noted that most of the statute’s general purpose factors were referenced but
pointed out that the district court did not indicate what contributions June
made to the preservation of the inherited property or whether the monthly
payments Kevin was ordered to make were provisional or independent
maintenance payments.174 As such, the Court upheld the original valua165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Funk, 270 P.3d at 43–44.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.
In re Marriage of Smith, 871 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1994).
Funk, 270 P.3d at 44–45 (citing Smith, 871 P.2d at 885).
Funk, 270 P.3d at 45 (citing Smith, 871 P.2d at 885).
Funk, 270 P.3d at 45.
Id.
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tions of the property but remanded the case so the district court could comply with the new rule by assessing the factors of § 40–4–202(1) explicitly
in its decision.175
The Montana practitioner should be aware of Funk because it clarifies
the manner in which § 40–4–202(1) is applied and overrules a precedent
that has been used in no less than 20 previous decisions. Parties can no
longer successfully argue that their spouses are not entitled to inherited
property simply because there is no evidence that they contributed to the
preservation or increase in the value of the property. This lack of evidence
is now simply a consideration for a court to make when distributing the
property rather than a limitation on its power to equitably apportion assets
amongst spouses.
—Dylan Jensen
V.

MONTANANS OPPOSED

TO

I–166 V. BULLOCK 176

Montanans Opposed to I–166 v. Bullock clarified the difference between the Montana Supreme Court’s treatment of a challenge to the procedural submission and approval of a proposed ballot measure as opposed to a
challenge to the substantive legality of a proposed ballot measure.177 Initiative 166 (“I–166”) aimed to establish the policy that, in Montana, corporations are not persons and are not entitled to constitutional rights.178 The
Court held that the I–166 explanatory statements satisfied requirements
specified in Montana Code Annotated §§ 13–27–312(2)179 and (4)180 and
that the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination was proper
under § 13–27–312(7),181 which prohibits consideration of the substantive
legality of a proposed ballot measure.182 The Court refused to entertain the
175. Id. at 47.
176. Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock, 285 P.3d 435 (Mont. 2012).
177. Id. at 436.
178. Id. at 435.
179. Section 13–27–312(2) requires ballot statements to “explain the purpose of the measure in 100
words or less and the implications of votes for or against, in 25 words or less.” Montanans Opposed to
I-166, 285 P.3d at 436 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(2) (2011)).
180. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(4) states: “The ballot statements must express the true and
impartial explanation of the proposed ballot issue in plain, easily understood language and may not be
arguments or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue.”
181. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7) provides in part: “The Attorney General shall review the
proposed ballot issue for legal sufficiency. As used in this part, ‘legal sufficiency’ means that the
petition complies with statutory and constitutional requirements governing submission of the proposed
issue . . . [but excludes] consideration of the substantive legality of the issue if approved by the voters.”
182. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 436.
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challengers’ arguments targeting the substantive legality of I–166 because
the issue had been improperly pled.183
The proponents of I–166 (“Proponents”) sought to charge Montana’s
elected officials with establishing a policy that corporations are not persons
and are not entitled to constitutional rights by limiting political spending in
elections and prohibiting corporate political campaign spending.184 The
measure further charged Montana’s congressional delegation with proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution likewise declaring that
corporations are not persons entitled to constitutional rights.185
Pursuant to § 13–27–202,186 the Proponents submitted the text and explanatory statements of I–166 to the Secretary of State on February 28,
2012.187 The Secretary of State forwarded the text and explanatory statements to the Legislative Services Division for review, which recommended
revisions to the Proponents.188 After the Proponents responded to these recommendations, the Secretary of State then forwarded the I–166 text and
explanatory statements to the Attorney General for a determination of legal
sufficiency and approval of the statements.189 On April 19, an Assistant
Attorney General informed the Secretary of State that the proposed measure
and ballot statements met statutory requirements.190 On April 20, the Secretary of State authorized Proponents to begin collecting signatures; the legal challenge to I–166 was subsequently filed on July 23, 2012.191
In an original proceeding before the Montana Supreme Court pursuant
to § 13–27–316,192 the petitioners, opponents of I–166 (“Opponents”),193
183. Id.
184. Id. at 435.
185. Id.
186. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–202 sets out the procedure for the submission of proposed ballot
measures. It defines the respective duties of the Secretary of State, the Legislative Services Division,
and the Attorney General in reviewing the proposed measure prior to authorizing its proponents to begin
gathering the signatures necessary to place the measure on the ballot.
187. Amend. Pet. for Rev. of Atty. Gen. Determ. of Leg. Sufficiency & Ballot Issue State. at 6,
Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock, http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2012-0439%20
Writ%20-%20Review%20—%20Petition?id{7DE3C2D9-2EF5-4B74-90B4-8C30C35F995B} (Mont.
Jul. 23, 2012) (No. OP 12-0439).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6–7.
191. Id. at 7.
192. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316(2) sets out the procedure by which challengers may file an
original proceeding in the Montana Supreme Court to contest the Attorney General’s approval of explanatory statements or the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination for a proposed ballot
measure.
193. The petitioners were: “Montanans Opposed to I-166, a Political Committee, Senator Dave
Lewis, Individually, and as an Elected Member of the Montana Legislature, [and] Phil Lilleberg, Individually, and as an Owner of FP, Inc., a Montana Corporation.” Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d
at 435.
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challenged the adequacy of the I–166 explanatory statements and the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination.194 In addition, the Opponents argued the measure itself was legally defective because: 1) it sought
to enact “a resolution and not a law”; 2) it sought to “improperly [amend]
the Montana Constitution”; and 3) it sought to “improperly [direct] elected
representatives how to vote.”195
The Attorney General responded that the “[r]esolution of these allegations . . . would involve ‘consideration of the substantive legality of
[I–166],’ which is explicitly excluded from legal sufficiency review.”196
The Attorney General further responded that the Opponents failed to specifically identify any portion of the approved ballot statements as being “untrue, prejudicial or argumentative,” and that the Opponents’ proposed alternative statement of purpose impermissibly reflected their substantive legality arguments rather than a challenge to the form of the approved
statement.197
The Montana Supreme Court began its analysis of the Opponents’
challenge by citing Article III, section 4 of the Montana Constitution, which
grants Montanans the right to directly propose and enact laws via citizen
initiative.198 The Court discussed the process for the submission and approval of proposed initiatives under § 13–27–202, which requires: 1) proponents to submit the text of the proposed measure, a statement of purpose,
and a statement of implications of a vote for or against the measure to the
Secretary of State; 2) the Secretary of State to submit the measure to the
Legislative Services Division for review; 3) the Secretary of State to submit
the measure to the Attorney General for review; and 4) following review by
the Legislative Services Division and approval by the Attorney General, the
Secretary of State to authorize proponents to begin collecting signatures.199
The Court then explained that the Attorney General’s review of a statement for legal sufficiency is limited under § 13–27–312 for statutory and
constitutional compliance.200 Within the word number constraints provided
in § 13–27–312(2), statements must explain the purpose of the measure
and the implications of votes for or against the measure.201 Citing
194. Id. at 435–436.
195. Id. at 436.
196. Atty. Gen. Response to Amend. Pet. for Rev. of Determ. of Leg. Sufficiency & Ballot Issue
State. at 4, Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock, http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%20120439%20Court%20Order%20-%20Response/Objection?id={D097628A-3283-4412-BF05-EC059DCF1
9EC} (Mont. Aug. 3, 2012) (No. OP 12-0439) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7)).
197. Id. at 13.
198. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 435.
199. Id. at 435–436.
200. Id. at 436.
201. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/11

18

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON101.txt

unknown

Seq: 19

8-APR-13

8:52

et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner

2013

LEGAL SHORTS

243

§ 13–27–312(7), the Court reiterated that the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency review expressly excludes consideration of a proposed measure’s
substantive legality if approved by the electorate.202
Continuing, the Court noted that since the Opponents both sued under
§ 13–27–316(2) and sought “no other relief,” they were limited to contesting “the adequacy of the explanatory statements and . . . the Attorney
General’s determination of legal sufficiency.”203 Disagreeing with the Opponents’ challenge of the legal sufficiency review, the Court stated that the
Opponents sought “to have this Court require that the Attorney General
undertake precisely the substantive legal review that is excluded by law.”204
The Court concluded that, as the Opponents did not allege and the Court did
not find legal insufficiency in the procedural submission of I–166 under
§ 13–27–312, the Attorney General’s review of I–166 was not legally insufficient.205
Addressing the Opponents’ challenge to the I–166 explanatory statements, the Court noted that the Attorney General’s approval of explanatory
statements is controlled by § 13–27–312(4), which requires statements be
“true and impartial,” in “easily understood language,” and not argumentative or prejudicial.206 The Court then summarily concluded that the I–166
explanatory statements satisfied the requirements of both §§ 13–27–312(2)
and (4).207 In closing, the majority referred to precedent where it held a
proposed initiative facially unconstitutional and reiterated that it would not
consider substantive challenges to I–166 when the Opponents’ only properly pled challenge was presented pursuant to a statute that expressly precluded consideration of a ballot measure’s substantive legality.208
Justice Baker concurred with the Court’s holding, but declared in a
separate opinion that her agreement was not confined to the Opponents having “failed to request the proper form of relief.”209 Rather, Justice Baker
argued, the relevant statutes indicate a “clear preference to defer ruling on
the constitutionality of a proposed initiative petition until after the results of
the election at which it is submitted to voters.”210 She observed that the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 436.
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(4)).
207. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 436.
208. Id. (citing State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984)). In Harper, the
Montana Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s request to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the
challenged initiative on the ballot. The Court also held the proposed initiative unconstitutional as it
coercively sought to compel the Montana Legislature to act in a specific way, which violated Article V
of the United States Constitution. Harper, 691 P.2d at 827–829.
209. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 437 (Baker, J., concurring).
210. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 3–2–202(5) & 13–27–316(6)).
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Opponents’ claim that I–166 was constitutionally defective did not meet the
Court’s requirements to exercise its original jurisdiction and that the Opponents’ challenge would be justified only if and after the electorate approved
I–166.211 Justice Baker concluded by noting that, if and after I–166 was
approved by the voters, the Court’s holding should not preclude the Opponents from seeking “declaratory judgment against I–166 in district court
and pursuing the ‘normal appeal process’ in this Court.”212
In the lone dissent, Justice Nelson contended that I–166 should not be
submitted to the electorate.213 As I–166 did not seek to enact a law, but
rather sought to establish a policy, Justice Nelson argued it violated the
scope of initiative power granted to citizens under Article III, section 4 of
the Montana Constitution.214 Consequently, he asserted, the Attorney General should have found I–166 facially unconstitutional because it did not
comply with “constitutional requirements governing submission of the proposed issue to electors.”215 Justice Nelson also asserted that the Court
could address the substantive merit of a proposed ballot measure, as it recently did in Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch,216 where it affirmed its
right to declare invalid proposed ballot measures that are facially unconstitutional.217 He noted the Reichert Court reasoned that allowing a defective
measure to proceed to voters “creates a sham out of the voting process . . .
when in fact the measure is invalid regardless of how the electors vote.”218
Addressing its substance, Justice Nelson referred to I–166 as “a feelgood exercise exhibiting contempt for the federal government and, particularly, the United States Supreme Court.”219 Justice Nelson argued that
I–166 would be ineffective in this exercise because “the Supreme Court did
not rely on corporate ‘personhood’ in its decision in Citizens United [v.
Federal Election Commission],”220 and thus I–166’s proposition to establish that corporations are not “persons” would accomplish “absolutely nothing for First Amendment purposes.”221 Furthermore, he argued, I–166’s
211. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 437 (citing Mont. Rs. App. P. 14(2), (4)).
212. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 437–438 (quoting Mont. R. App. P. 14(4)).
213. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 444 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7)).
216. Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455 (Mont. 2012).
217. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 444 (citing Reichert, 278 P.3d at 473–474). In
Reichert, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a district court order enjoining the Secretary of State from
placing Legislative Referendum 119 on the ballot. The Reichert Court declared that pre-election review
was not simply an option, but was the Court’s duty when encountering a facially unconstitutional ballot
measure. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 473–474.
218. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 441 (quoting Reichert, 278 P.3d at 474).
219. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 438.
220. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
221. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 439–440 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
898–908).
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scheme to circumvent Citizens United would likely face the same fate as
Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act, which was struck down by the United
States Supreme Court in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock.222 Given the improbability that I–166 could successfully overcome
these obstacles, Justice Nelson concluded that it was “little more than a
source of false hope for many voters” and was a waste of “the electorate’s
time and resources.”223
The Montanans Opposed to I–166 Court appeared to elevate form over
substance when considering the Opponents’ pre-election challenge to the
constitutionality of I–166. By doing so the Court underscored the importance of the pled cause of action within a pre-election challenge to a ballot
measure and distinguished its recent opinion in Reichert, where it found
unconstitutional a proposed legislative referendum before it was submitted
to voters. In the future, opponents of ballot measures seeking to challenge
the procedural submission or administrative approval of the measure may
still obtain relief under § 13–27–316(2). However, opponents who wish to
challenge the substantive legality of a proposed ballot measure would apparently be best served by directly challenging the measure’s substantive
constitutionality within a declaratory judgment action and by seeking the
appropriate injunctive relief.
—Quinton King
VI.

MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. MONTANA BOARD
OF OIL & GAS CONSERVATION 224

In Montana Wildlife Federation v. Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, the Montana Supreme Court clarified the standards for an environmental assessment (“EA”) under the Montana Environmental Policy Act
(“MEPA”).225 Specifically, the Court upheld the district court’s ruling that
the Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation (“Board”) made adequate
environmental assessments and acted reasonably when it issued 23 gas well
permits to Fidelity Exploration and Production Company (“Fidelity”) in the
Cedar Creek Anticline (“CCA”) area of Eastern Montana.226 The Court
held that the Board properly tiered227 the EAs to two previous environmen222. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 440 (citing Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132
S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
223. Montanans Opposed to I-166, 285 P.3d at 440.
224. Mont. Wildlife Fedn. v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conserv., 280 P.3d 877 (Mont. 2012).
225. Id. at 884, 891–892.
226. Id. at 891–892.
227. Tiering “is the process of incorporating by reference coverage of general matters in broader
environmental impact statements, such as national program or policy statements, into subsequent nar-
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tal impact statements (“EIS”) issued in 1989 and 2003, despite the fact that
the EAs did not explicitly reference those EISs.228 The Court also held that
the EAs sufficiently evaluated the cumulative impacts of the proposed gas
wells under MEPA’s “hard look” requirement.229
In 2008, both the Montana Wildlife Federation and the National Wildlife Federation (“Federations”) brought suit against the Board after it issued
23 permits for infill gas wells to Fidelity.230 The Federations sought to
enjoin the Board from issuing the permits, contending that the EAs that it is
required to prepare when it issues permits on private/fee and State owned
lands did not comply with MEPA standards.231 In particular, the Federations alleged the Board failed to take into consideration the effect new gas
wells would have on populations of sage grouse and did not properly tier its
assessments to previous studies or evaluate the cumulative impact of more
wells in the CCA.232 After suit was filed, the district court permitted Fidelity and the Montana Petroleum Association to intervene as defendants in the
action.233 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the Board responded to the Federations’ allegations by arguing that the approval of infill
gas wells was not a significant enough action to justify more than checklist
EAs234 under MEPA.235
The district court found that, under Montana Code Annotated
§ 82–11–144, it had the power to set aside the 23 permits if it found the
Board’s actions to be “arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and [sic] abuse
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”236 It also recognized tiering as an accepted method of incorporating the analysis of issued
EISs into other documents as a means of eliminating unnecessary repetition.237 Declaring that the Board’s issuance of permits passed the “hard
look” test, the district court noted the large number of gas wells already
present at the proposed drilling sites and the existing presence of the infrarower environmental analyses, such as site-specific statements.” Id. at 888 (quoting N. Plains Res.
Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28)).
228. Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 888–889.
229. Id. at 891.
230. Id. at 884.
231. Id. at 881, 884.
232. Id. at 887.
233. Id. at 884.
234. The checklist forms used by the Board had ten categories for review: “(1) Operator and Well
Location; (2) Air Quality; (3) Water Quality; (4) Soils/Vegetation/Land Use; (5) Health Hazards/Noise;
(6) Wildlife/Recreation; (7) Historical/Cultural/Paleontological; (8) Social/Economic; (9) Remarks or
Special Concerns for the Site; (10) Summary: Evaluation of Impacts and Cumulative Effects.” Mont.
Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 882. The Board may use checklist EAs when it “determines a routine action
with limited environmental impact is at stake.” Id. at 889.
235. Id. at 884–885.
236. Id. at 884 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 82–11–144(2)(a) (2011)).
237. Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 884.
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structure required to support new wells.238 The district court granted summary judgment to the Board and refused to set aside the permits it issued
because the court found that the EAs were properly tiered to earlier
programmatic EISs and that the addition of infill gas wells to a pre-existing
gas field was a routine action that only required a checklist EA.239
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court first considered tiering and
cumulative effects under the “hard look” standard.240 It explored in detail
the programmatic EISs (“PEIS”) issued by the Board in 1989 and 2003 and
recognized that both EISs analyzed the impact of gas and oil production on
wildlife, particularly their effects on sage grouse.241 The Court noted that
the overall goal of the 1989 PEIS was to establish an efficient way to integrate MEPA into its decision making.242 The 1989 PEIS contained a section that established specific guidelines for protecting sage grouse from oil
and gas development, such as creating a buffer zone around strutting
grounds and restricting operations in the early morning hours of spring
when sage grouse are strutting.243
The Court further recognized that the 2003 EIS built upon the 1989
PEIS by evaluating the effects of coal-bed natural gas development
(“CBNG”) in Montana.244 In addition to CBNG, the Court noted that the
2003 EIS also looked into the damage conventional oil and gas drilling
might have on wildlife, mentioning specifically the habitat necessary for
sage grouse and their potential for becoming an endangered species.245 The
Court also referred to the 2003 EIS’s statement that it “‘may be tiered from
or incorporate by reference other documents’ including the 1989 PEIS.”246
The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Board properly
tiered the EAs to the 1989 and 2003 EISs247 and satisfied MEPA standards
in evaluating the cumulative effects of permitting new gas infill wells.248
The Court reasoned that even though the EAs made for the review of the 23
permits issued to Fidelity contained no explicit reference to the earlier
PEISs, the Board nonetheless clearly relied on them and thus satisfactorily
tiered to them.249 The Court disagreed with Federations’ assertion that to
appropriately tier to a previous statement an EA must specifically mention
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 884–885.
Id.
Id. at 888, 889.
Id. at 887–888.
Id. at 882.
Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 882, 887.
Id. at 882–883.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 888–889.
Id. at 891–892.
Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 888–889.
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the documents it wishes to incorporate.250 It pointed out that the authority
Federations relied on only addressed EISs and that EAs, by contrast, do not
have as lofty of requirements to satisfy.251 The Court reasoned that because
the Board’s administrative actions on record documented its reliance on the
1989 and 2003 EISs, the EAs implicitly tiered to them.252 Finally, even
though it felt the EAs should make the public aware of the information used
in issuing permits, the Court held that ordering a remand solely on that
ground would accomplish little but further delay.253
Addressing its environmental review, the Court held that the Board
met MEPA requirements by being sufficiently thorough in examining the
cumulative effects of drilling under the “hard look” standard.254 The “hard
look” standard requires a court to focus “on the validity and appropriateness
of the administrative decision making process without intense scrutiny of
the decision itself.”255
Federations argued that the 23 EAs prepared for the gas infill wells
were virtually identical, made no site specific analyses, and failed to consider cumulative impacts because the checklist format of the EAs ignored
the existence of the other wells Fidelity intended to drill in the area.256 To
show the Board’s lack of thoroughness, Federations pointed to an EA performed by the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(“DNRC”) in the area at issue.257 In that EA, the DNRC found sage grouse
habitats that the Board did not identify in its environmental review.258
Notwithstanding Federations’ contentions, the Court held the administrative record demonstrated that the Board systematically considered
enough cumulative impacts to constitute a hard look at the matter.259 Specifically, the Court reasoned that both the checklist EAs and the 1989 and
2003 EISs used to create the checklist EAs referenced the cumulative effects of drilling and that the “institutional body of knowledge” upon which
the Board staff based its decisions provided adequate background for the
Board to determine that “the addition of twenty-three wells in a heavily
developed field would have limited impact.”260
250. Id. at 888 (citing Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983)).
251. Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 888 (citing Village of False Pass, 565 F. Supp. at 1141).
252. Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 888–889.
253. Id. at 889.
254. Id. at 891–892.
255. Id. at 890 (citing Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 197 P.3d 482, 492
(Mont. 2008)).
256. Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 890.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 891–892.
260. Id.
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In a lone dissent, Justice Wheat argued the EAs were unlawful because
they failed to tier to the previous EISs under National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) standards, failed to inform the public of potential impacts,
and gave only generalized statements about the cumulative effects of the
proposed wells.261 Justice Wheat criticized the majority for ignoring the
fact that although MEPA does not require explicit tiering in the EAs, the
plain language of NEPA does, and that standard should have been used to
determine whether the EAs in question were properly tiered to the EISs of
1989 and 2003.262 Further, he argued the legislature made it clear that the
purpose of EAs was to “inform the public and public officials of potential
impacts resulting from decisions made by state agencies.”263 According to
Justice Wheat, allowing the Board to hide its decision-making process
within the confines of institutional knowledge does not inform the public.264 To that end, Justice Wheat contended, neither does the majority’s
acceptance of one-line authoritative statements as sufficiently thorough assessments of cumulative effects.265
In Montana Wildlife Federation, the Court seemingly watered down
the “hard look” that the Board must take to comply with MEPA. The Court
also established that EAs may satisfy MEPA standards without expressly
tiering to EISs and that the Board may pass the “hard look” standard with
assertions supported by arguably tenuous historical administrative actions.
Even though the Court insisted that agencies like the Board must inform the
public of environmental impacts, it provided that the Board’s failure to do
so may not amount to reversible error. The Court’s holding seems to establish that as long as the agency in question can point to a systematic method
of addressing an environmental issue, the actual proficiency of the agency’s
methods may remain unquestioned, unmonitored, and unchecked without
aggressive research and perhaps litigation. Montana practitioners should
recognize that the Court’s affirmation of the lack of procedural transparency
in the EAs and EISs at issue in Montana Wildlife Federation may provide a
basis for greater deference to agencies, making future MEPA challenges
much more difficult.
—Russell Michaels

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 894–895 (Wheat, J., dissenting).
Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 894–895.
Id. at 894 (quoting Mont. Code. Ann. § 75–1–102(3)(a)).
Mont. Wildlife Fedn., 280 P.3d at 894.
Id.
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NORRIS V. FRITZ 266

In Norris v. Fritz, the Montana Supreme Court held that treating physicians acting as non-retained expert witnesses need not provide heightened
disclosures containing complete statements of their opinions.267 The Court
concluded the parties typically have an idea of non-retained experts’ opinions because of the experts’ confluent role with the case’s facts.268 However, the Court noted, the opposing party must have notice about the subject
matter of a non-retained expert’s intended testimony in order to prevent
unfair surprise.269
T.M.N., the child of Kathryn and Joe Norris (“Norris”), experienced a
cyanotic episode after a premature birth by C-section on October 11,
2001.270 Dr. Strizich, the treating physician, admitted T.M.N. to a Special
Care Nursing Unit and ordered an IV with glucose.271 He tested T.M.N.’s
blood glucose and received a reading of 63, which caused him to both increase the amount of glucose being supplied by the IV and order a retest for
the next morning.272
The results of the retest arrived the next evening when T.M.N. was
under the supervision of Dr. Reynolds, a colleague of Dr. Strizich.273 The
second test showed T.M.N.’s glucose levels to be 38; identified as “critical”
by the lab report.274 However, T.M.N. was now breastfeeding, and Dr.
Reynolds discontinued the IV without ordering any further glucose tests.275
Another doctor from the same clinic, Dr. Fritz, took over T.M.N.’s
care at noon on October 13.276 Although informed of the earlier glucose
results, he did not restart the IV or order any tests because he believed
T.M.N. was receiving sufficient glucose from his mother’s milk, which
could be ascertained by visual inspection.277 However, T.M.N. became unresponsive the following morning, and tests revealed his glucose level to be
zero.278 T.M.N. was transported to Benefis Hospital in Great Falls; he suffered severe, permanent developmental issues.279
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Norris v. Fritz, 270 P.3d 79 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 81.
Id.
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On May 5, 2005, Norris filed a complaint against St. Peter’s Hospital,
Dr. Reynolds, and Dr. Fritz.280 Pretrial proceedings included a deposition
of Dr. Strizich, who was questioned by counsel for Norris and the defendants.281 In 2006, Norris filed a disclosure identifying their expert witnesses,
which included all of T.M.N.’s treating physicians.282 The district court
declared the treating physicians were not retained for purposes of litigation
and thus expert disclosure pursuant to 26(b)(4) was unnecessary.283
At trial, Norris’s counsel said in her opening statement that Dr.
Strizich would testify that a glucose level of 50 was the threshold for a baby
like T.M.N. and that T.M.N. was hypoglycemic on October 13 when tests
showed his glucose levels to be 38.284 Dr. Fritz subsequently moved to
limit the scope of Dr. Strizich’s testimony, stating that until Norris’ opening
statement, he had been unaware that Dr. Strizich intended to testify about
the standard of care in relation to glucose levels.285 The district court
granted Dr. Fritz’s motion, and Dr. Strizich was instructed he was only
allowed to testify regarding his personal practice, not the standard of
care.286
The jury found in favor of Dr. Fritz, and Norris appealed.287 The
Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court’s ruling, which limited
Dr. Strizich’s testimony, determining the district court should not have precluded Dr. Strizich’s testimony about the appropriate standard of care.288
The Court began distinguishing between retained and non-retained expert witnesses by pointing out that Montana Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4) (“Rule 26”) only requires disclosures for retained experts, whose
facts and opinions are “acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial.”289 The Court referred to the federal rule regarding retained experts, which is identical to the Montana rule.290 The Court explained the
Federal Advisory Committee limited application of the federal rule to retained experts and not experts whose information is acquired on account of
personal experience with the occurrence that is the basis for a particular
lawsuit.291
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 83.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 83.
Id.
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The Court reasoned that the purpose of Rule 26 is to provide an opposing party access to a retained expert’s identity and opinions, which would
otherwise remain unknown.292 A non-retained expert, the Court explained,
is a hybrid witness, who has both personal knowledge of relevant factual
events and specialized training allowing him to form expert opinions about
those facts.293 Therefore, the Court continued, his identity and opinions are
typically readily available to both parties.294
The Court cited sister jurisdiction courts’ determinations that parties
should be aware of the existence and potential opinions of a treating physician because they can subpoena medical records that identify treating physicians.295 These courts concluded the information within the medical
records is sufficient to prevent unfair surprise from a treating physician’s
testimony.296
The Court recognized that few jurisdictions have determined whether a
treating physician could testify about the standard of care in medical malpractice cases without an expert disclosure.297 Some courts have held a
physician’s opinion on the standard of care requires full disclosure because
such an opinion may not be an obvious deposition inquiry as it would not
ordinarily be necessary for a physician to formulate such an opinion in order to treat the patient.298 However, the Court noted, other jurisdictions
have held a physician may form an opinion about the standard of care during the course of treatment if he formed his opinion during the patient’s
treatment.299
The Court concluded Dr. Strizich’s opinion fell into the second category and it was necessary for him to determine what standard of care to
follow when he monitored and treated T.M.N.’s glucose levels.300 Therefore, the Court determined he should be considered a hybrid witness and
should be permitted to testify about the standard of care applicable to treating T.M.N.301
While the federal rule only requires a complete statement of opinions
from retained experts, it requires non-retained experts to provide a summary
of their expected testimony to prevent unfair surprise.302 The Court stated
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83 (citing Drew v. Lee, 250 P.3d 48, 55 (Utah 2011)).
Norris, 270 P.3d at 83 (citing Drew, 250 P.3d at 55).
Norris, 270 P.3d at 83.
Id. at 83–84 (citing Hansen v. C. Hosp. Corp., 686 N.W.2d 476, 481–482 (Iowa 2004)).
Norris, P.3d at 84 (citing Schreiber v. Est. of Kiser, 989 P.2d 720, 726 (Cal. 1999)).
Norris, 270 P.3d at 84.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
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that Rule 26 does not have any disclosure requirements regarding the identities or opinions of non-retained experts.303 The Court referred to its Faulconbridge v. State304 opinion, where it held that full Rule 26 disclosure
must be made for retained experts, but for non-retained experts it is only
required that the opposing party have adequate notice of the testimony.305
The Court observed that Dr. Fritz did not contend he was unaware of
Dr. Strizich’s identity, but instead argued he did not know of Dr. Strizich’s
opinions and was surprised to learn Dr. Strizich would be testifying about
the standard of care for an infant’s blood glucose level.306 Norris’ expert
disclosure did not include a level-specific glucose standard, however, the
Court noted, it did state Dr. Strizich would testify about the standard of care
he would employ generally.307 The Court considered it likely Dr. Strizich
would formulate his opinions on the standard of care based on his medical
training, current medical literature, and national practice.308 In addition, the
Court reasoned Dr. Fritz had access to T.M.N.’s medical records, which
contained reports by Dr. Strizich, nursing notes detailing the care Dr.
Strizich provided, and lab reports.309 Based on this information, the Court
concluded it was likely Dr. Strizich had formed an opinion on the standard
of care for a newborn blood glucose level.310
Though Dr. Fritz redeposed several expert witnesses after expert disclosures were filed, the Court pointed out Dr. Fritz did not redepose Dr.
Strizich despite notice in Norris’s disclosure that Dr. Strizich would testify
as to his own standard of care and his central role in the occurrence.311 The
Court noted Dr. Fritz was aware T.M.N.’s blood glucose level was a central
issue in the case, as he presented three experts who discussed the standard
of care in relation to blood glucose levels.312
The Court concluded Dr. Fritz had adequate notice about Dr. Strizich’s
opinions to prevent unfair surprise.313 It determined the exclusion of Dr.
Strizich’s testimony prejudiced Norris’s case because it affected a material
issue.314 The Court reversed and remanded to the district court with in303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Norris, 270 P.3d at 85.
Faulconbridge v. State, 142 P.3d 777 (Mont. 2006).
Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 786.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 85.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 87.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 88.
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structions to vacate the prior judgment and order a new trial, in which Dr.
Strizich could testify regarding the standard of care.315
In Norris, the Court looked to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
fill in the gap in Rule 26 in relation to non-retained experts.316 It also made
a more concrete rule out of the suggestion in Faulconbridge that opposing
counsel have notice of a non-retained expert’s expected testimony.317 Indeed, Norris makes it clear that an opposing party must have adequate notice of a non-retained expert’s identity and scope of testimony.318 This is a
significant interpretation to the scope of Rule 26 because it will increase
opportunities for parties to rely on treating physicians as experts. In light of
this holding it will be important for parties to employ broad discovery procedures in order to learn of any potential opinions of a treating physician.
—Kathleen Molsberry
VIII.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY V. FEIT 319

In BNSF Railway Company v. Feit, the Montana Supreme Court held
that, if a person’s weight exceeds normal range and affects at least one body
system, obesity may constitute a physical or mental impairment—even
without an underlying physiological disorder or condition.320 The Court’s
holding was in response to a certified question regarding the phrase “physical or mental impairment,” and its possible application to obesity, as found
in Montana Code Annotated § 49–2–101(19)(a).321 The Court also held
that contemporaneous federal laws and regulations can provide guidance for
interpreting the Montana Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).322
On February 27, 2009, Eric Feit filed a complaint with the Montana
Department of Labor and Industry (“Department”) against Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”).323 Feit alleged that BNSF
discriminated against him because of his weight.324 In March 2010, the
Department ruled in Feit’s favor and awarded him damages.325 BNSF then
appealed the decision with the Montana Human Rights Commission, which
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
Norris, 270 P.3d at 85.
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 226–227.
Id. at 230–231.
Id. at 227.
Id.
BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 227.
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affirmed the Department’s finding.326 Finally, BNSF petitioned the United
States District Court for review, and both parties moved for summary judgment.327 The Honorable Donald W. Molloy then certified the following
question to the Montana Supreme Court: “Is obesity that is not the symptom
of a physiological condition a ‘physical or mental impairment’ as it is used
in Montana Code Annotated § 49–2–101(19)(a)?”328
Judge Molloy also certified the following set of facts.329 First, BNSF
extended Feit a conditional employment offer, partly dependent on successful completion of a physical examination and BNSF’s Medical History
Questionnaire.330 On February 6, 2008, BNSF told Feit he was unqualified
for the position because of the “significant health and safety risks associated
with extreme obesity.”331 BNSF then informed Feit that, for further employment consideration, he would need to either lose 10% of his body
weight or complete supplemental physical examinations “at his own expense.”332 At no point did BNSF promise Feit a job, regardless of the exam
outcomes.333 Feit completed all of the additional physical examinations except for a sleep study, which BNSF required before it would further consider him for the job.334 Finally, because Feit could not afford the sleep
test, he attempted to lose 10% of his body weight; a genuine dispute surrounds the documentation of Feit’s weight loss.335
The Montana Supreme Court began its analysis by noting its “job” was
to answer the certified question, not to “apply the law to the facts presented
. . . .”336 Accordingly, the Court first observed that, within the MHRA,
employers cannot discriminate against potential employees because of
“physical or mental disability.”337 The Court then looked further into the
MHRA, which defines a “physical or mental disability” as:
(i) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of a
person’s major life activities;
(ii) a record of such an impairment; or
(iii) a condition regarded as such an impairment.338
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 226.
329. Id. at 227.
330. Id.
331. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 227.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 49–2–303(1)(a) (2011)).
338. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 49–2–101(19)(a)) (emphasis in
original).
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Next, the Court opined that it had never interpreted the word “impairment” and would need to look at federal discrimination law under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for direction.339 Additionally,
the Court observed that the Montana Legislature desires courts to interpret
the MHRA uniformly with federal law.340 Furthermore, because the
MHRA definition of “physical or mental disability” is nearly verbatim to
the ADA version, the Court concluded that federal law would guide its
analysis.341 More specifically, the Court also decided that federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations and interpretative guidelines would be both useful and permissible in formulating its
analysis.342
The Court then discussed how Congress recently passed the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”); however, the ADAAA did not substantively change the definition of “disability,” which consequently remains
nearly identical to the MHRA version.343 However, the Court noted that
the ADAAA did reiterate “a broad scope of protection to be available under
the ADA” and that “[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted.”344 Finally,
the Court acknowledged that Congress also passed the ADAAA because it
saw federal courts limit the “broad scope of protection” that the ADA provides.345
Because neither the ADA nor the ADAAA defines “physical or mental
impairment,” the Court looked to the EEOC’s definition of “impairment”:
“Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems . . . .”346 Moreover, the
Court acknowledged that the EEOC’s Interpretative Guidance “distinguishes between conditions that are impairments and conditions that are
simply physical characteristics . . . .”347 The Court then focused on the
following language in the Interpretative Guidance:
The definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone that are within “normal” range and are not the result of a physiological disorder.348
339. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 49–2–101(19)(a)).
340. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228.
341. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
342. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Sleath v. W. Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d
1042, 1048 (Mont. 2000)).
343. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), (3)).
344. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 at 3554–3555).
345. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 228 (citing Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)).
346. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 229 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)).
347. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 229.
348. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h)).
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The Court reasoned that, while weight is seemingly distinguished as a physical characteristic (and not an impairment), “by using the conjunctive ‘and,’
the regulation excludes weight from the definition of impairment only if it
is both ‘within normal range’ and ‘not the result of a physiological disorder.’”349 Essentially, the Court held that obesity may constitute an impairment if it is beyond “normal range” and affects at least one body system
even if there is no underlying physiological disorder.350
To supplement its analysis, the Court remarked that the EEOC Compliance Manual, while not binding, provides additional guidance and, therefore, “[t]his Court affords an agency’s interpretation of its rule ‘great
weight’ . . . .”351 One section of the EEOC Compliance Manual states that
“severe obesity . . . is clearly an impairment,” which the Court used to
support its conclusion that “weight outside the ‘normal range’ may constitute a physiological condition within the definition of impairment if it ‘affects one or more body systems.’”352 Finally, the Court cited recent federal
cases that have adopted similar conclusions.353
The Court dismissed BNSF’s argument—that other federal courts have
held that obesity is not an impairment unless accompanied by an underlying
physiological disorder—by noting BNSF’s selection of cases were all decided before Congress passed the ADAAA, which reiterated broad interpretation of disability.354 BNSF also contended that, because Montana had not
adopted the ADAAA, the Court should disregard the changes and that the
ADAAA is not retroactive and is therefore impermissible to apply.355 The
Court rejected those arguments by bluntly stating: “we are interpreting
Montana statutes, not the ADAAA . . . and we are construing ‘impairment’
for the first time.”356 The Court also took the opportunity to reiterate its
conclusion that “prior case law directs us to use federal interpretations as
guidance, without confining our review to authority in place on the date the
MHRA was first enacted.”357
Justice Morris, while agreeing that federal law should provide guidance, filed a dissent and asserted that a “plain reading” of the definition for
“impairment” indicates that a “physiological condition must be present
349. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 229.
350. Id. at 231.
351. Id. at 229–230 (citing Easy v. Mont. Dept. of Nat. Resources & Conserv., 752 P.2d 746, 748
(Mont. 1988)).
352. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 230 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. § 902.2(c)(5)(ii)).
353. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 230 (citing EEOC v. Resources for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011); Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, 2010 WL 5232523 at **7–8 (N.D. Miss.
2010)).
354. BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 229.
355. Id. at 230.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 230–231 (citing Hafner v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 947, 951 (Mont. 1994)).
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before an impairment exists.”358 Further, Justice Morris argued the majority misconstrued the language found in the EEOC’s Interpretative Guidance.359 Justice Morris, like BNSF, noted that various courts have held
that obesity must be first associated with a physiological condition before
being considered an impairment.360 According to Justice Morris, the
ADAAA did not change the definition of “impairment,” and thus the
Court’s reliance on the ADAAA “provides no justification to ignore the
definition’s plain language” or prior case law.361 Chief Justice McGrath
joined Justice Morris’s dissent.362
Justice Rice filed a separate dissent, arguing that the Court erred by
basing its analysis on the ADAAA, which did not take effect until after the
alleged discrimination took place.363 Therefore, Justice Rice asserted that
pre-ADAAA federal jurisprudence should guide the Court’s analysis, which
largely requires a physiological condition to be present before examining
the impairment issue.364
Montana practitioners and employers should take notice of BNSF Railway Company v. Feit and its permissive interpretation. Essentially, obesity
may constitute an impairment if it is outside “normal range” and affects at
least one body system—regardless if an accompanying physiological condition exists. Furthermore, practitioners need to keep abreast of changes to
federal ADA regulations because the Court will look to them for guidance,
even when the Montana Legislature has not explicitly adopted the amendments.
—Jordan Peila
IX.

STATE V. COOK 365

In State v. Cook, the Montana Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s suspended sentence could be revoked even if the violation of a
condition was not willful, so long as the State is not responsible for any
portion of his failure.366 This holding reiterated the decision in State v.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 231 (Morris & McGrath, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 231–232.
Id. at 232.
BNSF Ry. Co., 281 P.3d at 233 (Rice, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 235–236.
State v. Cook, 272 P.3d 50 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 57–58.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/11

34

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON101.txt

unknown

Seq: 35

8-APR-13

8:52

et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner

2013

LEGAL SHORTS

259

Lee367 that fault-based analysis is the exception rather than the rule.368
Criminal attorneys should be aware of Cook as it affirms that the State may,
absent limited exceptions, revoke a suspended sentence when a violation of,
or failure to meet, a condition is by no fault of the defendant.
In 1999, after pleading guilty via an Alford plea,369 Rozell Roland
Cook (“Cook”) was sentenced to two concurrent, 20-year terms with the
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) with ten years suspended for two
counts of sexual assault.370 He was designated as a tier III sexual offender.371 The suspended portion of his sentence contained 25 conditions.372 Important among these conditions were requirements that Cook
follow all the rules and regulations of Adult Probation and Parole; obtain
counseling or evaluations at his own expense as required by his supervising
officer and follow all recommendations; obtain sex offender counseling by
a Montana Sex Offender Treatment Association (“MSOTA”) recognized
therapist at his own expense and comply with all conditions and recommendations; and live “at least 1,500 feet away from schools, playgrounds, toy
stores, etc.”373
In January 2010, six months before his ten-year commitment was up,
Cook was notified that his proposed residence upon release in Great Falls
was within 1,500 feet of a prohibited place, which would be a violation of
his suspended sentence conditions.374 The possibility of staying at a rescue
mission in Great Falls was also eliminated as an option due to its proximity
to a women’s athletic center, so Cook’s probation officer told him he could
be released as a transient.375 Three days before his scheduled release, he
was notified that his outpatient treatment provider was dropping him due to
a lack of adequate housing.376 On June 17, 2010, two days before Cook
was scheduled to be released from custody, the State moved to revoke the
suspended portion of his sentence for being in violation of his sentencing
367. State v. Lee, 31 P.3d 998 (Mont. 2001) (holding that due process requires the consideration of
alternatives to incarceration when failure to complete a condition of sentence suspension is solely the
fault of the State).
368. Cook, 272 P.3d at 57 (citing Lee, 31 P.3d at 1002).
369. An Alford plea is one where the defendant chooses to plead guilty while professing his innocence, believing the evidence against him would likely result in conviction and the plea agreement
would be in his best interest. See N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970).
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Cook, 272 P.3d at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cook, 272 P.3d at 53.
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conditions.377 Cook was arrested while still incarcerated and held pending
further hearings on the matter.378
During the pendency of the hearings, Cook found two different treatment providers willing to treat him in either Helena or Great Falls.379 The
State refused to allow Cook to be treated in Helena, as he could not be
supervised there by his parole officer.380 The treatment provider in Great
Falls was ruled out because she was not a member of MSOTA.381 Cook
also found potential housing options in both cities, but all were ruled out by
the State as being potentially near where children lived or congregated.382
Despite two months of diligent searching, Cook was unable to find any one
option that would satisfy all his release conditions.383
The district court found that Cook was in violation of three of the
suspended sentence conditions; revoked his suspended sentence and sentenced him to two concurrent, ten-year commitments with five years suspended; and reimposed the original conditions of his suspended sentence,
along with 16 new conditions.384 The court noted that the difficulty Cook
faced in finding appropriate housing and treatment options was “a result of
his conduct and record. And that is not something that the Court can remedy or overlook.”385
Cook raised three issues on appeal: first, he argued the State could not
petition to revoke his suspended sentence before the period of suspension
had begun;386 second, he argued he could not be found to be in violation of
his conditions when he was still in custody and when the failure to meet the
conditions was not by any willful act on his part; and third, he argued the
court could not impose additional conditions that were not part of his origi377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 54.
381. Id.
382. Cook, 272 P.3d at 53–54.
383. Id. at 54.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Cook based this argument on the Court’s ruling in State v. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d 300 (Mont. 2011),
decided January 26, 2011, during the district court proceedings. Cook, 272 P.3d at 55. In Stiffarm, the
Court held that, contrary to prior case law, Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–203(2) did not allow for a petition
to revoke to be filed before the suspension began. Id. (citing Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 303). On April 20,
2011, the legislature amended Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–203(2) to specifically allow a petition to be
filed before the period of suspension has begun. Cook, 272 P.3d at 55. The Court held in Cook that the
new rule from Stiffarm would only apply prospectively as it was procedural and not substantive. Id. at
56. Thus, only petitions to revoke filed between January 26, 2011, and April 20, 2011, were subject to
dismissal for being filed prior to the suspension period. Justice Nelson disagreed with this holding,
instead arguing that the rule from Stiffarm was always the rule because the statute was clear and unambiguous. Id. at 59–60 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Since the State filed the petition before the suspension
began, he would have reversed on this issue and not addressed the others. Id. at 60.
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nal sentence.387 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
revocation of Cook’s suspended sentence,388 but reversed and remanded to
the district court on the third issue.389
Cook argued that his right to due process was violated because he did
not willfully violate the conditions of his suspended sentence and alternatives to revocation existed to meet the State’s penological interests.390 The
State countered that Cook violated the conditions of his suspended sentence, that due process does not require that violations be willful, and that
the district court considered but rejected alternatives to revocation.391
Addressing Cook’s arguments, the Court first recognized that the Due
Process Clause requires consideration of alternatives to incarceration when
revocation is based on a failure to pay a fine or restitution and the defendant
cannot do so “through no fault of his own.”392 The Court explained, however, that this exception did not prohibit a revocation in other contexts, even
if the failure to obey a condition is not intentional or willful.393
The Court next distinguished its holding in State v. Lee.394 In Lee, the
defendant was required to complete a sexual offender program while incarcerated as a condition of his suspended sentence.395 After spending several
years on a wait list for sexual offender treatment and being delayed by a sitdown strike, Lee was unable to finish the treatment before his release date,
so his suspended sentence was revoked.396 The Montana Supreme Court
ultimately held that due process requires a court to consider alternatives to
incarceration that would satisfy the State’s penological interests when the
failure to complete a condition of probation is “solely the fault of the
State.”397
In Cook, the Court held that despite the exception identified in Lee, an
analysis based upon fault is not necessary where the violation is “of conditions related to the defendant’s rehabilitation or the protection of the public.”398 Despite a lack of culpability on his part, Cook’s failure to satisfy
387. Cook, 272 P.3d at 54 (majority).
388. Id. at 59.
389. Id. at 58–59. The Court upheld all but one of the conditions as being reasonably related to the
objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of society. The Court remanded to have the lower court
strike a condition requiring GPS monitoring for the entirety of his supervision as it was not a service
provided in Montana and thus impossible to satisfy. Id. at 59.
390. Cook, 272 P.3d at 54.
391. Id. at 56.
392. Id. (citing Lee, 31 P.3d at 1000–1001 and quoting Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660, 668–669
(1983)).
393. Cook, 272 P.3d at 56–57 (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668).
394. Cook, 272 P.3d at 57.
395. Id. (citing Lee, 31 P.3d at 999).
396. Cook, 272 P.3d at 57.
397. Id. (citing Lee, 31 P.3d at 1002).
398. Cook, 272 P.3d at 57 (citations omitted).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013

37

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON101.txt

unknown

Seq: 38

8-APR-13

8:52

Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 11

262

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74

his sentence conditions frustrated the purpose of his suspended sentence—
rehabilitation—because he was still determined to be an “extremely dangerous sex offender . . . in need of the highest level of supervision.”399 Since
Cook could present no evidence that his failure to satisfy the conditions was
in any way attributable to the State, the Lee exception did not apply, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence.400
Practitioners should be aware of Cook and the possible implications
for revocation of suspended sentences. Cook involved a failure to meet
conditions over which the State had final approval, such as housing and
treatment locations. Despite the fact that the State refused to accept options
Cook’s probation officer had approved, the Court did not identify this as a
“fault of the State” pursuant to the Lee exception. Instead, the Court refused to conduct a fault-based analysis when the violation of conditions
relates to “rehabilitation or protection of the public.” It remains to be seen
what conditions would not fall under such a wide umbrella.
—Fallon Stanton
X.

STATE V. COVINGTON 401

In State v. Covington, the Montana Supreme Court determined the
Montana Constitution does not require a jury to make a factual determination that a prior conviction existed before it is then used to enhance a defendant’s sentence.402 The Court affirmed the district court’s decision to sentence defendant Richard Covington to life without parole based on his prior
convictions.403 In doing so, the Court outlined the burden a defendant must
meet to establish that the Montana Constitution provides broader protection
for a particular right than that provided under the United States Constitution.404 The Court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Covington’s motion to suppress a binder and notebooks seized by the police.405
In April 2007, a man wearing a dark mask and jacket held a knife to a
woman and stole her purse as she walked to her car after work.406 Witnesses reported seeing the man, later determined to be Richard Covington,
enter the Billings Brewpub. The Billings Police Department recovered a
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id.
Id. at 57–58.
State v. Covington, 272 P.3d 43 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 45–46, 48, 49.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 44–45.
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number of items related to the robbery from the Brewpub bathroom, including a makeshift pantyhose mask, a knife, handcuffs, and pepper spray.407
After conducting a DNA test on the pantyhose, the police were able to
link Covington to the crime and sought a search warrant for his residence to
locate further evidence, including specific items from the robbery such as
unique postage stamps and possible pawn receipts.408 Upon searching Covington’s home, the police seized items related to the robbery and located a
binder and notebooks containing information relevant to a contemporaneous homicide investigation in which Covington was a person of interest.409
The police later seized the binders and notebooks under a second search
warrant.410
Covington was charged with several offenses, including robbery and
homicide.411 The district court denied Covington’s motion to have the
binder and notebooks suppressed.412 The jury convicted Covington on all
charges.413 At sentencing, the district court noted that Covington had been
convicted of robbery in 1981 and 2009.414 Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–18–219 requires a court to give a life sentence without parole to a
defendant sentenced for certain violent felonies—including robbery—if the
defendant has two previous violent felony convictions.415 Thus, the district
court issued a life sentence without a possibility of parole based on Covington’s two previous robbery convictions.416
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court first concluded the district
court did not err when it issued a life sentence without the possibility of
parole.417 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States,418 the United States Supreme Court held a court may determine a prior conviction exists in order to
enhance a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum without infringing on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.419 First,
Covington argued that more recent decisions have eroded the Supreme
Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres.420 Covington primarily relied on
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Covington, 272 P.3d at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Covington, 272 P.3d at 45.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–219 (2011).
Covington, 272 P.3d at 45–46.
Id. at 48.
Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
Id. at 243–244.
Covington, 272 P.3d at 46.
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Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Apprendi v. New Jersey,421 in which Justice
Thomas stated Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided.422 Although
Covington raised Apprendi to call into doubt the Almendarez-Torres ruling,
he conceded that Almendarez-Torres remains good law.423 Failing in his
first contention, Covington went on to argue Article II, sections 24 and 26
of the Montana Constitution provide a broader level of protection than the
Sixth Amendment, requiring a jury to determine the existence of a prior
conviction before that conviction may be used to enhance a defendant’s
sentence beyond the statutory maximum.424
Although the Montana Constitution can provide broader protection
than the United States Constitution,425 the Court determined a defendant
must establish “sound and articulable reasons” that the Montana Constitution provides greater protection for the particular right at issue.426 The
Court found such reasons may be established if a defendant can demonstrate: 1) unique textual language within the Montana Constitution dictating
enhanced protection;427 2) evidence of historical intent to provide broader
protection;428 or 3) evidence that the right in question can only be read in
conjunction with other rights that are distinctly Montanan.429 The Court
will only undertake this state constitutional analysis when the defendant
demonstrates the existence of one or more of these factors.430
In Woirhaye v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court,431 the Montana Supreme Court determined the Montana Constitution provides an enhanced right to a jury trial in at least one circumstance.432 The defendant in
Woirhaye challenged a statute limiting a defendant charged with a misdemeanor and tried in justice court to only one jury trial.433 The Court found
this violated an individual’s right to a jury trial under the Montana Constitu421. Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
422. Covington, 272 P.3d at 46 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J. concurring)).
423. Covington, 272 P.3d at 46–47.
424. Id. at 47.
425. Id. (citing State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 909 (Mont. 2001)).
426. Covington, 272 P.3d at 47 (citing State v. Rosling, 180 P.3d 1102, 1117 (Mont. 2008)).
427. Covington, 272 P.3d at 47 (citing State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 148 (Mont. 2009) (noting an
enhanced right to privacy exists in the text of the Montana Constitution)).
428. Covington, 272 P.3d at 47 (citing State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 499–500 (Mont. 2008) (finding
the Montana Constitution provides greater protection from electronic monitoring based on fear of technology’s infringement on individual privacy expressed by delegates in the 1972 Constitutional Convention records)).
429. Covington, 272 P.3d at 47 (citing State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (1995) (finding the Montana
Constitution provides greater protection against illegal searches and seizures because Article II, section
11 must be read in conjunction with the privacy rights included under Article II, section 10)).
430. Covington, 272 P.3d at 47.
431. Woirhaye v. Mont. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., 972 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1998).
432. Id. at 802–803.
433. Id. at 800–801.
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tion.434 In finding the Montana Constitution provided broader protection
than the Sixth Amendment, the Court examined the history and text of the
Montana Constitution as it pertained to this particular right.435 The Court
found that the delegates at the 1972 Constitutional Convention expressed a
desire for greater jury trial rights for misdemeanor defendants and that the
text of the Montana Constitution guarantees “an absolute right not to be
convicted of a misdemeanor by less than a unanimous jury.”436
In Covington, the Court distinguished Woirhaye by reasoning that
Covington failed to provide any reason that the Montana Constitution provides broader protection for jury trials regarding the factual determination
of prior convictions than those provided under the United States Constitution as determined in Almendarez-Torres.437 The Court also noted Covington failed to make an argument under any of the “sound and articulable
reasons” previously outlined.438 Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of
the district court and upheld Covington’s sentence.439
The Court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Covington’s motion to suppress the binder and notebooks seized under the second search
warrant.440 As part of their initial search of Covington’s residence, officers
reviewed a binder and notebooks they believed could contain specific evidence linking him to the April robbery, including stamps stolen from the
victim’s purse and pawn receipts showing Covington had possession of
other items recovered after the robbery.441 The Court agreed with the district court that the “remaining contents of the binder and notebooks became
subject to plain view during the officer’s [sic] authorized search for the
stamps and receipts[,]” giving officers sufficient probable cause for a second warrant to seize these items.442
Justice Cotter concurred with the Court’s judgment and wrote a separate opinion in which Justice Nelson joined. Justice Cotter argued against
the necessity of the extensive analysis performed by the Court on the first
issue.443 Justice Cotter quoted the United States Supreme Court’s Blakely
v. Washington444 opinion, where it held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 803.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 802.
Covington, 272 P.3d at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 49.
Covington, 272 P.3d at 49 (Cotter & Nelson, JJ., concurring).
Blakely v. Wash., 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt . . . .”445 Justice Cotter pointed out the Montana Supreme Court previously followed Blakely in its holding in State v.
Vaughn.446 According to Justice Cotter, Covington did not overcome the
holdings of Blakely or Vaughn because he failed to argue the district court’s
findings of his two prior robbery convictions were erroneous and did not
make an argument that a jury determination of his convictions was constitutionally necessary.447
Ultimately, Montana practitioners should take note of the Court’s decision in Covington as it clearly demonstrates the Court will consider whether
or not the Montana Constitution provides broader protection for a particular
right than that provided under the United States Constitution only if the
defendant provides “sound and articulable reasons.”448 Additionally, it is
important for a defendant to realize a court can determine, as a matter of
law, the existence of prior convictions in order to enhance his or her sentence beyond the statutory maximum.449
—Samantha Stephens
XI.

PATTERSON ENTERPRISES, INC. V. JOHNSON 450

In Patterson Enterprises, Inc. v. Johnson, the Montana Supreme Court
held the defense of assumption of risk may be used in cases involving voluntary participation in an abnormally dangerous activity.451 In doing so,
the Court declined to extend the subjective knowledge standard applied to
products liability cases.452 The Court clarified that both the law and legal
principles of strict products liability do not necessarily apply to cases involving abnormally dangerous activities.453
In the fall of 2006, private landowners hired Patterson Enterprises, Inc.
(“Patterson”) to construct a road.454 Due to the mountainous terrain, Patterson needed to first drill and blast rock outcroppings for the planned road.455
Having no personnel who were trained or knowledgeable in blasting, Patter445. Covington, 272 P.3d at 49 (emphasis in original) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (internal
citation omitted)).
446. Covington, 272 P.3d at 49 (citing State v. Vaughn, 164 P.3d 873, 883–884 (Mont. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds, Whitlow v. State, 183 P.3d 861, 866–867, n. 4 (Mont. 2008)).
447. Covington, 272 P.3d at 49.
448. Id. at 47 (majority).
449. Id. at 48.
450. Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 P.3d 93 (Mont. 2012).
451. Id. at 99.
452. Id. at 97 (citing Lutz v. Natl. Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455, 461 (Mont. 1994)).
453. Patterson, 272 P.3d at 100–101.
454. Id. at 94.
455. Id. at 94–95.
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son contracted with Archie Johnson Contracting (“AJC”) to conduct the
blasting.456 Patterson’s project superintendent, Adam Pummill (“Pummill”), worked as the excavator operator to remove blasted material.457
On February 26, 2007, AJC blasted 500 yards of rock, which created
an overhang that concerned both AJC and Patterson personnel.458 Archie
Johnson met with the project owners to discuss “[h]ow to deal with the
overhang,” although it is unclear if AJC made any attempts to bring the
overhang down.459 On March 1, 2007, AJC’s driller, Henry Bentley
(“Bentley”), noticed Pummill excavating the blasted rock near the overhang; yet, Bentley failed to warn Pummill of any danger.460 More than an
hour later, Bentley noticed Pummill excavating directly under the overhang,
so he “signaled for Pummill to exit the excavator.”461 Almost immediately,
the overhang collapsed and crushed the excavator; Pummill was not
harmed.462 Pummill testified that prior to the incident he discussed the
overhang’s hazards with the blasters.463 Pummill further testified it would
have been very dangerous to reach and properly clear the debris from underneath the overhang.464
After AJC denied liability for the damaged excavator, Patterson filed
suit on September 11, 2007, claiming negligence, breach of contract, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and strict liability.465
AJC counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought money still owed for
its performance.466 In addition, AJC asserted the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.467
The district court denied Patterson’s motion for summary judgment on
strict liability and AJC’s motion for partial summary judgment for its affirmative defenses.468 The court found there were questions of fact for a
jury to decide based on “strict liability under the abnormally dangerous activity legal theory” and the delay between the blasting and when the damage to the excavator occurred.469 At trial, the jury concluded that the excavator damage was caused by AJC’s blasting, that Patterson and its employ456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
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ees assumed the risk of harm, and that Patterson was 49% and AJC was
51% at fault for the incident.470 Patterson was awarded $50,000 in damages
and AJC was awarded damages on its counterclaim in the amount of
$19,255.16.471 Patterson appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.472
On appeal, Patterson argued that AJC should have been held strictly
liable for all damages resulting from the creation of a dangerous condition
and that Pummill lacked the knowledge to properly assess the condition.473
AJC countered that there was sufficient evidence to show Pummill knew
about the overhang’s dangers and that he assumed the risk while underneath
the overhang.474
Despite Patterson’s urging, the Montana Supreme Court declined to
extend its holding from Lutz v. National Crane Corporation,475 which established a subjective standard for assumption of risk in product liability
cases.476 In Lutz, the defendant’s crane cable operator recognized the lifethreatening hazard of overhead power lines that he contacted.477 The Lutz
Court determined the assumption of risk defense did not apply because Lutz
inadvertently came into contact with the power lines.478 The Patterson
Court held Lutz was distinguishable because Pummill intentionally excavated beneath the overhang and knew the dangers associated with doing
so.479 Pummill testified about his discussion with the blasters regarding the
overhang and “[e]xpressed [his] concerns that [he], also, felt it was very
hazardous.”480
Supporting its holding, the Court cited Matkovic v. Shell Oil Company,481 where it extended the defense of assumption of risk to strict liability based on abnormally dangerous activities.482 The Matkovic Court saw
“[n]o reason to apply a different standard to strict liability” that arises from
an abnormally dangerous activity or from a defective product.483 The Patterson Court then discussed Restatement (Second) of Torts § 523 comment
d, which provides that a person who voluntarily participates in an abnor470.
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Id.
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 96.
Id. at 96, 101.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 97.
Lutz, 884 P.2d 455.
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 98 (citing Lutz, 884 P.2d at 457).
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 97 (citing Lutz, 884 P.2d at 457).
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 98 (citing Lutz, 884 P.2d at 457).
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 98.
Id. at 99.
Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 707 P.2d 2 (Mont. 1985).
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 99 (citing Matkovic, 707 P.2d at 4).
Patterson, 272 P.3d at 99 (citing Matkovic, 707 P.2d at 2).
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mally dangerous activity assumes the risk.484 Although the Court conceded
§ 523 was not effectively raised during trial, it nevertheless held that comment d of § 523 correctly sets forth the standard establishing when assumption of risk applies to abnormally dangerous activities.485 The Court also
held the district court did not err when it modified the jury instruction regarding assumption of risk by referencing a condition, rather than a product.486 Finally, the majority disagreed with both the dissent’s and Patterson’s position that strict products liability principles govern abnormally
dangerous activities under such facts.487
In his dissent, Justice Wheat argued that the two statutorily-defined
elements of the assumption of risk defense, as applied in Lutz, were not
met.488 Pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 27–1–719(5), a defendant
asserting the assumption of risk defense must first prove “[t]he injured party
discovered the defect, or the defect was open and obvious . . . .”489 Second,
a defendant must prove “[t]he injured party unreasonably made use of the
product (or condition).”490 Justice Wheat argued Pummill did not understand the danger of the overhang because he lacked both specialized knowledge and experience in blasting.491 Furthermore, Justice Wheat deemed
Pummill’s work under the overhang reasonable.492
Patterson clarified when the assumption of risk defense may be raised
in strict liability cases when abnormally dangerous conditions exist. To
prove assumption of risk, the Montana practitioner must first demonstrate
the injured party was aware of the danger. Second, the Montana practitioner must show the injured party voluntarily came into contact with the
danger. Finally, the Montana practitioner should recognize Patterson indicates that strict products liability law is likely to have limited future applicability in cases involving abnormally dangerous conditions.
—Carina Wilmot
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